comprising the "Age of the Enlightenment." He argues persuasively that the philosophes' philosophy can be treated as a coherent historical phenomenon, despite their quarrels and contradictions, because they comprised a coherent unit, a "family"; and their dialectic should be understood as a result of the family's actual experience in the actual environment of eighteenth-century Europe and America. Accordingly, the philosophes responded to the demystifying message of the classics, turned that message against Christian mythology, and then liberated themselves from their liberators by rejecting neoclassicism and embracing modernity. Modernity, autonomy, or "The Science of Freedom" (Gay sticks so many ingenious titles and subtitles to his text that it is difficult to remove his ideas from their packaging) means humane, critical, tolerant, realistic liberalism-a faith worthy of modern modernity, Gay suggests, for he has no pretense of writing value-free history.
This dialectical definition raises the problem of determining what set the Enlightenment apart in time as a distinct phenomenon. If Gay's dialectic cannot be pinned down with precision and supported by rigorous reference to evidence, it may float away like the most ethereal Hegelianism: for no dialectic can be static, even if it is intended only as a "definition." It therefore seems best to follow the unfolding of Gay's Enlightenment stage by stage, pausing to take up themes as they appear-notably in the case of the antireligious, "revolutionary," and psychological aspects of the Enlightenment-and reserving two special themes for the end: the Enlightenment's relation to sociopolitical issues and to the spread of literacy.
Assuming that the Enlightenment originated with an appeal to antiquity, the problem is to show what in antiquity appealed to the incipient Enlightenment rather than to other eras. Gay reveals an affinity between the philosophes and the ancients, but he does not prove that the philosophes read their classics differently than did the "classical" writers of the seventeenth century. Even if Gay's argument could be proven-and to do so would require a multitude of studies in comparative literature as thorough as Jean Seznec's Essaiis slur Diderot et l'antiquite and Reuben Brower's Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Alllision-the differences in the response to the ancients would have to be explained, and the explanation might involve elements that are unrelated to Gay's "thesis." Gay's discussion of the Renaissance illustrates this difficulty, because he argues that the classical revival during the Renaissance produced the same dialectic as that of the Enlightenment. Then, in order to avoid entangling dialectics or interpreting the Enlightenment as a rerun of the Renaissance, he is forced to emphasize the elements that separated the two periods -the reawakening of religious controversy and the subsequent spirit of toleration and skepticism, the scientific revolution, and the systematic philosophies of the seventeenth century. But are not these new developments precisely the ones that brought about the Enlightenment? And are they not extraneous to Gay's dialectic? Sensing this danger, Gay tries to fit Montaigne, Grotius, Bayle, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Locke into a chapter entitled "Pagan Christianity," one of the hybrid terms like "Epicurean Stoicism" that he seems to coin when his argument is overstrained. An admixture of paganism and Christianity may have colored the ideas of those thinkers as it did in the thought of such pagan-Christians as Aquinas and Augustine, but the real question at issue is: What was fundamental and what accidental in producing the Enlightenment? It will not do to display the pagan-Christian dia-lectic at the front door and to smuggle Montaigne, Grotius, Bayle, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Locke in the back. Once those men have got a foot inside they will take over, making it impossible to preserve the dialectic even as window dressing.
The Enlightenment's enemies present as many problems as its precursors for Gay's thesis, because, according to Fran9ois Bluche, the magistrates of the Parlement of Paris had the same favorite authors as Gay's philosophesCicero, Horace, Ovid, and Vergil.3 And according to the Livre et societe group, the educated but unphilosophic general public shared the same taste for the classics. In order to explain why the philosophes reacted peculiarly to the common stock of their culture, Gay would have been forced back to standard accounts of the Enlightenment's origins, which he seems to avoid. His own account does not deal with the classic studies of Paul Hazard and Philippe Sagnac, which argue that the French Enlightenment grew out of a profound crisis during the last years of Louis XIV's reign; nor does it incorporate the recent work on the "crise de conscience" period by Pierre Goubert and Lionel Rothkrug. Gay barely mentions Fenelon, Saint-Simon, and Boulainvilliers; and he entirely ignores Vauban, La Bruyere, and Boisguillebert.
While Gay has difficulty in getting his thesis off and running, his antithesis almost runs away with him. Here the main theme is the radicalization of the Enlightenment's antireligious character. Gay sees it advancing inexorably from toleration to skepticism, deism, and the full-blooded atheism of Hume and Holbach. The philosophes certainly undermined established churches, but few of them, even in the coterie Holbachique, went over to atheism.4 And some intellectual currents flowed in the opposite direction-from the arid atheism of Toland and Woolston in Britain and the godless Temple poets in France to the Great Awakening that spread across Europe from Stockholm, Saint Petersburg, and Bavaria during the prerevolutionary decade. As Auguste Viatte has shown, the Enlightenment went out in a great blaze of illuminism.
How incompatible were Christianity and the Enlightenment, in any case? They were enemies in France, but there philosophy fed on persecution and a tradition of anticlericalism absent in Protestant countries. Perhaps, also, it owed more to Jansenism than Voltaire, in his horror at the convulsionaires, wanted to admit. Such, at least, is a hypothesis dangled temptingly in " The synthesis suffers from the same birth defects as its dialectical brothers. According to Gay's formula, "modernity" or "autonomy" came into being sometime in the late eighteenth century, when the philosophes felt as free from the classics as they did from the Christians. But this was also the era of neoclassicism, which Hugh Honour has defined recently as "the style of the late eighteenth century, of the culminating, revolutionary phase in that great outburst of human inquiry known as the Enlightenment."7 If Honour is correct, then Gay's synthesis belongs before his thesis, and his eighteenth century runs backward. If Gay is correct, it is difficult to understand why expressions of classicism like the Palais Bourbon and the Oath of thle Horatii appeared at the end of the eighteenth century and why manifestations of modernity like the scientific revolution8 and the dispute between the ancients and the moderns (which Gay does not mention) occurred at the end of the seventeenth. But Gay's synthesis suffers less from misplae-d modernity than from a tendency to exaggerate the Enlightenment's radicalism. For just as stage two of the dialectic leads to atheism, stage three produces revolution-and reopens the whole question of the connection between Enlightenment and revolution in the eighteenth century. Gay finds the connection fundamental, because he sets 1688 and 1789 as chronological boundaries for his book. But he hardly refers to the revolutions of England and France and concentrates instead on the American Revolution-the "Finale" to the dialectic, yet a strangely unrevolutionary affair. Gay does not even mention the Declaration of Independence, which is usually interpreted as the culmination of radical Enlightenment in America. But he goes into a detailed discussion of The Federalist Papers, where he finds the omnipresent "dialectical movement away from Christianity to modernity" (2: 563). This unorthodox emphasis creates some confusion, because the most recent work by Bernard Bailyn and Alan Heimert makes it more difficult than ever to imagine the Founding Fathers trading impieties with Hume and Holbach. But Gay's approach permits him to scuttle natural law, which he views as a vestigial metaphysics left over from the seventeenth century and progressively eliminated in the eighteenth. Of course he does not deny that the American revolutionaries, like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. often invoked the laws of nature. But he interprets Hume's "revolutionary" (2: 455) attack on natural law as more fundamental to the Enlightenment than Diderot's "revolutionary" (2: 457) defense of it. The confusion comes because almost everything the philosophes did seems to have been revolutionary. Their emphasis on man's natural goodness was "subversive, in fact revolutionary" (2: 398), and "revolutionary" was their "rehabilitation of the passions" (2: 192). Their "revolutionary ideology" (1: 27) extended far and wide-to a "revolution" (2: 369) in historiography and in the theater (Miss Sara Sampson, "a revolutionary drama" [2: 264]), not to mention the "utterly subversive manner" (2: 390) in which they attacked religion. In art, Reynolds's career was "revolutionary in its implications" (2: 234), although as aestheticians Diderot and Lessing were "revolutionaries who never lost their respect for tradition" (2: 250). The alarmed reader may be reassured to learn that the philosophes' aversion to the Gothic was "no mark of radicalism" if not downright "reactionary" (2: 217), and that "as a group, the philosophes were a solid, respectable clan of revolutionaries" (1: 9). But then he discovers that unlike the classicists of the seventeenth century, who had "concealed their radicalism" (1: 282), the philosophes turned classicism into "an instrument of subversion" (1: 264); and their penchant for ancient Greece "remained subversive" (1: 75) while "the Enlightenment itself was moving toward overt and bellicose radicalism" (1: 200). Gay's Enlightenment is such an explosive affair that one wonders how the Old Regime ever got as far as 1789. The philosophes had the place wired, mined, and booby trapped. But Gay's narrative does not reach 1789 either: it stops just after the American Revolution-rather anticlimatically for the reader watching the pressure rise toward the big bang. Nonetheless, The Federalist makes a good if somewhat unrevolutionary point to call a halt on all the radicalizing and undermining, because not only was the Enlightenment's influence on the French Revolution problematical, but Gay had argued in an earlier article that it was relatively unimportant.9 He had to dispose of his Humean, Holbachean explosives somewhere; so he dumped them on the United States. An easier solution, however, would have been to delete "revolutionary" from its myriad appearances in the text and to admit that the Enlightenment was a pretty mild affair after all. By 1778, when all of Paris was salaaming before Voltaire, the last generation of philosophes had become pensioned, petted, and completely integrated in high society. Ten years later men like Morellet and Dupont labored valiantly to prevent the collapse of the Old Regime, as was perfectly natural, for the High Enlightenment was one of its most important potential props. Quesnay, Turgot, and even Voltaire offered a program of liberal reform, a possibility of perpetuating the social order by blunting its conflicts. The idea of subverting society, if it ever occurred to them, would have struck them as monstrous. Not only did they believe in the basic structure of the Old Regime, they thought that it ought to remain hierarchical. As d'Alembert explained: "Is a great effort of philosophy necessary to understand that in society, and especially in a large state, it is indispensable to have rank defined by clear distinctions, that if virtue and talent alone have a claim to our true homage, the superiority of birth and eminence commands our deference and our respect?""1' With exceptions like Rousseau, the philosophes were elitists. They enlightened through noblesse oblige in company with noblemen, and often with a patronizing attitude toward the bourgeois as well as the common people. In the article "Go'ut" of his Dictionnaire philosophliqie, Voltaire observed, "Taste is thus like philosophy; it belongs to a very small number of privileged souls, . . . It is unknown in bourgeois families, where one is continually occupied with the care of one's fortune." It has been argued recently that, far from rising with the middle class, liberalism descended from a long line of aristocrats, and so did the Enlightenment.'1 Except for men like Condorcet, the last of the philosophes fit in perfectly with the Sevres porcelain and chlinoiserie of the salons; the High Enlightenment served as frosting for France's thin and crumbling upper crust.
If there was any "radicalism" among the abbes and petits marquis of the synthetic Enlightenment, it was their faith in natural law, the very weapon that Gay excludes from his overstocked arsenal of revolutionary philosophy. The abbe Raynal, who lived to bewail the advent of the Revolution, polemicized against slavery because he considered it contrary to the law of natureand this was not innocuous humanitarianism, because powerful interests fed on slavery, as the Amis des noirs were to learn when they tangled with the The final dimension of Gay's dialectic is psychological. It, too, includes a revolution: the emergence of a new personality type-autonomous, demystified, modern man. Psychological modernity, Gay argues, came about through a collective identity crisis among the philosophes. To be sure, an identity crisis on top of a dialectic makes for problems, but Gay does not shrink from an explicitly Eriksonian attack on them. His bibliography contains three generous pages of acknowledgment of works on psychoanalysis and sex that he found helpful, beginning with Erikson-or rather beginning with the beginning: "In my view of sexuality, both its meaning and its history, I have been guided by Freud" (2: 628). It may be that Erikson is feeling overacknowledged these days (he has been heard to mutter unhappily about learning of an identity crisis in men's wear), but Gay does not use the magic formula frivolously. He argues that the struggle against Christianity produced an identity crisis in the entire family of philosophes and that they were able to resolve it because "it was precisely the growth of the superego in Western culture that made greater sexual freedom possible" (2: 204-5). Thus the dialectic of ancients, Christians, and philosophes apparently corresponded in some way to a three-cornered fight between the id, ego, and superego; and "the Enlightenment is the great rebellion of the ego against irrational authority" (1: 462). This interpretation, however, raises problems for the faithful Eriksonian reader who had been assured by the master that "the Renaissance is the ego revolution par excellence."13 The problems are compounded by Gay's assertion that "the sexual ideal of the Enlightenment may be said to have been the genital personality" (2: 628). Did some subdialectic synthesize orality and anality into genitality? If the philosophes reached such advanced modernity in the eighteenth century, where is "Western culture" today? Polymorphous perversion presumably.
Would it not be easier to give up the subdialectics, reversed antitheses, and entangled syntheses and to admit that the only dialectic in history is historiographical: the dialectic between those who get it right and those who get it written? In this case, alas, the written version is wrong: the Enlightenment was not a dialectical struggle for autonomy.
If to the spread of literacy. Both will be discussed in the context of French history, so that Gay's interpretation can be compared with the findings in Livre et societe', a book that belongs to the mainstream of advanced French historiography. The advance has occurred most spectacularly in the study of the Old Regime's social structure and has already reached the textbook stage. The uninitiate therefore need not read every word in the overwhelming tomes of Pierre Goubert, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Pierre de Saint-Jacob, Roger Dion, Rene Baehrel, Abel Poitrineau, Paul Bois, Frangois Bluche, and Jean Meyer. They can consult the brief and brilliant popularizations written by Pierre Goubert and Robert Mandrou,14 and there they will see that Gay is wrong to reduce the main sociopolitical issues of the eighteenth century to a dualism, pitting the these nobilijaire (the reactionary cause championed by the parlements and Montesquieu) against the these royale (the progressive cause of royal reformers and Voltaire). The Old Regime was too complicated to be classified so simply, and Voltaire's propaganda was too simplistic to be "good history always and good politics for decades" (2: 483). Contrary to what Gay maintains, the privileged orders paid important sums in taxation, and privilege was not consonant with "order" in any case: it ate through all levels of society, down to the very peasantry.15 In defending privilege, the parlements did not so much defend the nobility as protect a complex combination of vested interests typical of traditional societies. Their defense had a wide enough appeal to make their "liberal" rhetoric something more than hypocritical. By the end of the century, they were not the closed, caste-ridden bodies Gay describes.1" In fact, contrary to what Gay suggests, Turgot favored their recall in 1774, and Montesquieu's sympathy for them did not amount to a reactionary ideology. Voltaire was a sincere reformer but no great enemy of privilege: he was an annobli, courtier, grand seigneur, and proud possessor of a coat of arms with a fake marquis's crown.
The attack on privilege came less from Ferney than from such unphilosophic quarters as the chancellery and the Controle general. Consider the opinion of Charles Frangois Lebrun, who epitomizes a tradition of bureaucratic reform that shaped policy during Maupeou's attack on the parlements: "I did not want to enlist with the philosophes ... I would have preferred to see them devote their energies to a field other than the one they had chosen [i.e., the campaign against the church?]. It seemed to me that the government could make them into useful auxiliaries in the fields of administration and internal politics, could direct their attacks against the barriers which separated province from province, against privileges which placed uneven burdens on the people, against numberless contradictory customary laws, against the diversity of legal systems, against courts which were distant and inaccessible to people bringing suit, against usurped jurisdictions, against that swarm of guilds which hindered industry and stopped its progress. In every part of France there were reforms to carry out, p2ople to be enlightened."'7, How much did the reform movement owe to the Enlightenment? Far more, no doubt, than Lebrun acknowledged, but far less than is maintained by most intellectual historians. Administrative history, rather than philosophic theory, might be the place to look for the real thrust behind reformism. Many of the reforms decreed by the Revolution were drafted in the baroque bureaucracy of Louis XIV, as is illustrated in The Single Duty Project by J. F. Bosher, an excellent, unintended example of the social history of ideas. The Old Regime left enough of its red tape behind. Why not go to the archives and get wrapped up in it, instead of reading Voltaire, if one wants to learn how ideas and politics tangled in the eighteenth century? What is true of France applies even more to the rest of Europe. where "enlightened absolutism," as Gay astutely characterizes it, had little relation to the Enlightenment. Most sovereigns reformed in order to maximize power. They reformed with cameralists, not philosophes, drawing on a tradition of bureaucratic rationalizing that went back to the seventeenth, and sometimes the sixteenth, century.
The problems of measuring literacy and reading habits, which have attracted the heaviest research by the Livre et societe group, receive somewhat summary treatment by Gay: "In France (to judge from signatures on marriage certificates) the percentage of literate adults rose from about four in ten in 1680 to more than seven in ten a century later" (2: 58). Where Gay got this information is difficult to say, because his book is as short on footnotes as it is long on bibliography. The only historical study of literacy that covers the entire country ., 1958) . Pottinger, however, the boundaries of their social world-beyond the guild, the parish assembly, the regional units of administrative, legal, commercial, and religious institutions; beyond local ways of weighing, measuring, and paying for commodities; and beyond provincial techniques of raising children, dressing, and talking. Most Frenchmen probably did not speak French during Voltaire's childhood. By the time of his death ( 1778), improved roadways and demographic and economic expansion had brought the country together. But France did not cohere as a nation until after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. To understand how the Enlightenment "took" in such a fragmented society is no easier than to measure its influence on a European scale. Perhaps it never penetrated far below the elite in any area of eighteenth-century Europe.
It is the elite that interests Gay, so he should not be expected to produce a parish-by-parish sociological analysis. The elite shared a common, cosmopolitan culture. Nevertheless, to be a philosophe in Poland was a different experience than to be a philosophe in England. Gay tries to explain the differences by relating them to forces outside the philosophic "family," and this attempt makes him stumble on the complexities of social history. To take the example of literacy again, Gay's interpretation might be rescued by arguing that literacy is only important as a precondition for the growth of a reading public large enough to support a population of writers living entirely from their pens. Thus the crucial factor is that the total number of French readers increased, owing to population growth, although the incidence of literacy remained below the level of "modern" societies. spair at the general wretchedness, illiteracy, and brutishness of the poor" (2: 517), the philosophes begin to mutter about canaille, to flirt with enlightened absolutism, and to entertain ideas of a repressive, obscurantist "social religion" (2: 522). All's well that ends well. Saved from error by inconsistency, we are left in an eighteenth century we can recognize. Gay's Enlightenment remains recognizable, despite the confusion of its dialectic, because it covers familiar territory with a refreshing sense of rediscovery. Instead of striking for the frontier, Gay set out to clear a path through the monographs cluttering eighteenth-century historiography, and he succeeded where his dialectic failed. Following him is like touring with a Guide Michelin: one stops for the occasional degustation but never wanders far from the three-star routes. In the end, the verdict is clear: Gay's Enlightenment "vaut le voyage." But it is most valuable as one man's summing up, a synthesis of years of thoughtful reading, which one instinctively places on the shelf next to R. R. Palmer's The Age of the Democratic Revolution. Taken as a synthesis of social history and the history of ideas, however, it does not hold up because it will not stand without its dialectical scaffolding.
1I
It may be misleading to compare Gay's polished synthesis with the monographic articles published in Livre et societe. But the two works share a concern for what the Livre et societe group sometimes refers to as "l'histoire sociale des idees," and the comparison is revealing because the French begin by resisting the urge to synthesize. In a way, they locate the Enlightenment by not looking for it: instead, they put aside preconceptions about the "philosophie des lumieres" and seek out the unenlightened, the everyday, and the average. Their purpose is to reconstruct literary culture as it actually was. They therefore emphasize intellectual "inertia" and try to measure the depth of tradition, adopting an approach that had lain fallow since Daniel Mornet first experimented with it a half-century earlier.
While Cassirer was exploring the phenomenology of the Enlightenment mind, Mornet studied the Enlightenment as a social process. And while other literary scholars pondered the eighteenth century's great books, Mornet examined the means by which ideas diffused downward in society. His examination revealed that some books, which later ages took to be great, may not have been widely read under the Old Regime,2') and this revelation raised a new set of questions: What did eighteenth-century Frenchmen read? And what was the balance of tradition and innovation in early modern book culture? Mornet left these questions to his descendants in the Vle Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, and especially to the research team that produced Livre et socite. The researchers also inherited the techniques and traditions of the "Annales" school, which inclined them toward the study of "mentalites" rather than formal philosophic ideas and which made them receptive to the quantitative methods that Mornet had developed.
Owing to the complexity of the Old Regime and the diversity of its culture, the Livre et societe group tried to relate the literary and social life of eighteenth-century France by studying specific milieux: the obscure masses who "read" or listened to popular literature, the educated provincials who pur-chased traditional works, the elite of the provincial academies, and the Parisians who produced and consumed certain "advanced" periodicals.
The work done on the first of these four groups makes the most exciting reading, because it gives one a sense of contact with the remote mental universe of the eighteenth-century village. Robert Mandrou showed that such contact was possible in De la culture populaire aux 17c et 18e siecles (Paris, 1964), a brief but brilliant study of the crude paperbacks known as the Bibliotheque bleue, which colporters hawked through the countryside, along with thread and cutlery, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Printed on cheap paper with wornout type, sold for a sou, and read until they fell apart, these little books contain clues to a popular culture that is otherwise more inaccessible than the civilization inscribed on Cleopatra's Needle. They were read aloud by the few villagers who could read during the veillee, an informal evening get-together where women sewed and men repaired tools. The Bibliotheque bleue certainly belonged to a humble level of culture. Its stories often begin, "As you are about to hear....
But what message was communicated by this oral-written genre, and how did these books relate to the culture of the upper strata? Mandrou placed them far behind and below the Enlightenment. He showed that while the philosophes were stressing the rationality and sensibilite of human nature, the Bibliotheque bleue presented man as a slave of passion, driven by astrological forces and weird mixtures of the four humors and the four elements. While the freethinkers were naturalizing religion, the Bibliotheque bleue purveyed spiritualism, miracles, and hagiography. And while the scientists were emptying the universe of mystery, the Bibliotheque bleue filled the heads of its reader-listeners with visions of threatening, occult forces, which could be appeased by mumbo-jumbo and deciphered with recipe-knowledge-magic numbers, physiognomy, and primitive rituals. As literature, the Bibliotheque bleue adapted and simplified the medieval tales and Gaulois humor that polite society rejected in the seventeenth century. So Mandrou concluded that in comparison with the culture of the elite, the popular culture represented by the Bibliotheque bleue was both distinct and derivative. He went on to hypothesize that the popular literature of the Old Regime served as an ideological substitute for class consciousness among the masses. The peasants let their thoughts wander through a wonderland inhabited by Robert le diable, Oger le danois, Pierre de Provence, the giant Fierabras, and all manner of magical forces, instead of taking the measure of the real world of toil and exploitation.
Mandrou's study, a product of the "Annales" school but not of the Livre et societe group, prepared the way for the work of Genevieve Bolleme, who produced a general survey of the Bibliotheque bleue for volume 1 of Livre et societe and a detailed study of popular almanacs, which grew too big for volume 2 and was published as a separate monograph. Bolleme's analysis confirmed the main lines of Mandrou's but emphasized change rather than continuity in the evolution of popular literature. She found that the escapism and supernaturalism of the seventeenth century receded in the eighteenth with the influx of new attitudes: a more worldly and realistic orientation toward death, human nature, social relations, and natural forces. The old astrology and mythical tales gave way to a new sense of science and history. A new "morale sociale," an "esprit critique,"'1 and an awareness of current events indicated the penetration not merely of the Enlightenment but also of incipient revolutionary ideas.'' Despite their similarities, therefore, the studies of Mandrou and Bolleme point in opposite directions, the first toward the separation of cultural worlds and the intellectual enserfment of the masses, the second toward an increase in cultural integration, with popular literature acting as a liberating force.
It is too early to tell which view will prevail because there has not yet been enough detailed study of the many genres of popular literature. Bolleme's work is more detailed, as it concentrates on one genre-the popular almanac -whose development can be traced with some precision through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But the attempt to be precise about the cosmology of the common man raises methodological problems that did not hamper Mandrou's more general and impressionistic work. For not only did Bolleme move beyond general impressions, she attempted to enter right into the minds of the almanacs' reader-listeners, and there she found not merely mumbo-jumbo but "Kantian"23 categories. The categories-"observations astrales perpetuelles,"24 for example-do not summon up the Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, they arouse skepticism: Do the almanacs reveal the workings of the popular mind, or is this upside-down Cassirer? Bolleme did not prove the "popular" character of her almanacs. On the contrary, she drew material from some almanacs in bindings with aristocratic coats of arms; from others that expressed scorn for "les prejuges populaires";25 and from several that did not aim their aphorisms at the illiterate or the indigent: "Lis souvent"; "Achete des livres en tout temps"; "Ne tyrannisez point le pauvre debiteur"; "Peragit tranquilla potestas quod violenta requit."126 Poor Richard (a favorite in France) belonged in part to the lost, aristocratic world of Thomas Jefferson. There were almanacs for everyone, even in the upper reaches of the Old Regime. Bolleme acknowledged the differences among the almanacs but she grouped them all together for the purpose of analysis. And when she analyzed changes in the world view of the eighteenth-century populace she based her conclusions almost entirely on a sampling of only twenty-seven undifferentiated almanacs. The almanac upon which she relied most heavily and which she cited most often as evidence of advanced opinion at the popular level was Le messager boiteux, a work printed in Bern, Bale, Yverdon, Vevey, and Neuchatel-that is, by Swiss and in some instances by Protestants: not a reliable index to the attitudes of Catholic French peasants.27
But how reliable are the most folksy and most French of the almanacs? Frequently presented as the aphorisms of one shepherd ("le Grand Berger de la Montagne") addressing others, they have more of the flavor of Renaissance pastoralism than of a genuine shepherd-to-shepherd dialogue. The pastoralism may have been adapted for mass consumption from the "model" almanac of the fifteenth century, Le grantd compost des bergers, but the rhetorical pose might have had more in common with the masquerading of Marie-Antoinette than the mountainsidle egalitarianism detected by Boll'eme. The almanacs represent a popularization of upper-class culture, not popular culture in itself, because they were written for the people, not by the people, and they were not so much "written" as adapted in the most casual fashion, sometimes even by typesetters, from the literature of the elite. The great problem is not to extract their message, but to know whether that message was integrated in the indigenous culture of the masses.
Mandrou believed it was. The real dialogue, in his view, did not involve shepherds but publishers and colporters. The wandering salesmen knew what the peasants would buy and stocked up accordingly, thereby determining, in the long run, what the publishers produced. This argument seems convincing, but it applies more aptly to upper-class literature, which was far more sensitive to changes in styles and ideas than was the extremely standardized repertory of the Bibliotheque bleue. Unlike the educated elite, villagers may have been passive consumers of literature; they may have bought whatever was available, just because they wanted something-it hardly mattered what-to submit to the veillee reader or to stare at themselves. As Bolleme put it, there could have been an element of "magic,"' 2 a mystical respect for the word, in primitive reading-an obscure psychological process that probably had little relation to the sophisticated reading and consumer control that went on in high society. So changes in popular literature could have been imposed from above without being assimilated at the village level. The actual culture(s) of France's heterogeneous masses remains lost in an unfathomable ocean of oral tradition; the books that dropped into it probably disappeared without much effect, like missionaries in India.
Although the work of Mandrou and Bolleme may have failed to define the popular culture of eighteenth-century France, it enormously enriches the conventional view of the "Age of Reason." By revealing the existence and character of a vast literature that circulated on levels far below the philosophes, it helps place the Enlightenment in perspective. This attempt to define levels of cultural experience and to relate reading to specific social sectors is also the strong point of the other essays in Livre et soc0te, especially the study of provincial reading by Julien Brancolini and Marie-Therese Bouyssy. After examining book consumption in the provinces by gc-nre and by region, Brancolini and Bouyssy concluded that educated provincials were about as far removed from the Enlightenment as illiterate peasants. The weight of traditional culture crushed innovation in town and village alike.
The Brancolini-Bouyssy study was based on a quantitative analysis of the records of requests by provincial publishers for permissions simples, a kind of authorization to produce works that had fallen into the public domain by virtue of legislation reforming the book trade in 1777. These requests included the projected number of copies for each edition, so they provide more precise information than any of the sources consulted in previous attempts to chart the boundaries of literary culture in the Old Regime. The most important of these attempts was published by Franqois Furet in volume 1 of Livre et socie'te. It indicated that an enormous quantity of religious works and pre-eighteenth-century "classics" all but smothered the Enlightenment, although the production of scientific books and secular fiction increased at the expense of religious literature as the century progressed. Furet's findings derived from quantitative analysis of requests for privileges (strictly legal authorizations to publish) and permnissions ta(ites (more flexible and less formally legal authorizations). But they lacked data on the size of editions and the places where the books were marketed. Brancolini and Bouyssy provided precisely that information, thereby supplementing and confirming Furet's analysis. Taken together, the two studies suggest that cultural "inertia" weighed heavily on all of France and that the inroads of "innovation" did not penetrate far beyond Paris. Not a surprising pattern-unless it is measured against the conclusions of Genevieve Bolleme. news. These journals were really primitive newspapers-nolivelles d la main -not systematic literary reviews. They provide information about literary vogues but no quantifiable index to book consumption that can be compared with the statistics of Furet and Brancolini. So the "circulation du livre" in Paris and the cultural distance between Parisian innovators and provincial lollowers has yet to be measured.
The remainder of Livre et societe constitutes an attempt at measuring an even more elusive phenomenon: language. Historical semantics is now a booming discipline in France and one that promises to enrich the standard views of the Enlightenment by uncovering implicit concepts, the kind that escape exegeses of formal thought):13 Unlike conventional lexicology, historical semantics does not treat words as isolated units but rather as parts of a semantic field, a linguistic structure in which each part conveys meaning through its function within the whole. To grasp the meaning of individual eighteenth-century words, it therefore is necessary to reconstruct the linguistic structure of eighteenth-century French, treating the language as a fluid, socially determined system of communication, not as a fixed crystallization of thought from which parts can be arbitrarily detached. Put abstractly, these propositions seem reasonable enough; the difficulty is to put them into practice by discovering the mental processes behind eighteenth-century French as it has come down to us in the form of words congealed on paper. The research for volume 1 of Livre et societe produced a special collection of specimens of this dead communications system-a list of 40,000 book titles registered for privileges and permlissions tafites. By analyzing each title as a semantic field, computing the results statistically, and organizing the statistics into a series of semantic models, Frangois Furet and Alessandro Fontana tried to get at the meaning of two eighteenth-century words, histoire and methode.
Fontana's study, the more elaborate and ambitious of the two, best represents this new historical discipline. After 100 pages of laborious analysis, Fontana produced a "structural profile" of eighteenth-century meithode. In some cases, he concluded, nmthode was fixed, final, and transcendental or mathematical; in others it was fragmented, variable, and relative to particular disciplines. Its varied usage revealed a thought pattern moving from seventeenth-century apriorism to nineteenth-century relativism, and so suggests a cosmological shift that might be compared with the transition from the closed to the infinite universe that Alexandre Koyre discerned in studying the history outright idiolect, this reviewer must confess that he cannot follow Fontana's argument and that he finds historical semantics more impressive in principle than in practice.
But the two volumes of Livre et societe do represent an impressive attempt to rescue the intellectual history of eighteenth-century France from vague generalizations and to root it in the realities of social history. They reveal the general contours of literary culture as it was experienced by the great mass of eighteenth-century Frenchmen rather than as it appears in a few, posthumously selected classics. And they relate that literary experience to specific social groups-the obscure millions who participated in popular culture, the more elevated reading public of the provinces, the provincial elite, and the Parisian avant-garde. Whatever their shortcomings, these experimental essays show that the social history of ideas can be written. They do not redefine the Enlightenment any more successfully than Gay does, but they help to situate it in the complex context of eighteenth-century society.
III
The comparison of Gay's Enlightenm-ent and Livre et socite suggests that the social history of ideas must move out of its armchair phase and into the archives, tapping new sources and developing new methods. For how can it be written from within the confines of even a first-rate library? To pull some Voltaire from the shelf is not to come into contact with a representative slice of intellectual life from the eighteenth century, because, as the Livre et societe essays show, the literary culture of the Old Regime cannot be conceived exclusively in terms of its great books. Yet libraries crammed with classics cannot find room for the Bibliotheque bleue, a genre too undignified to be classified with "books" or to fit into our preconceptions about "culture." And every year our universities turn out thousands of certified experts in Western civilization who have read the Social Contract many times and have never heard of Les quiatre fils Aymnon. As far as the social history of ideas is concerned, the difficulty is not simply in recognizing "low" as well as "high" culture, because Gay's techniques-a matter of index cards and intelligence, but no original research-will not even uncover the social history of the intellectual elite. The finances, milieux, and readership of the philosophes can only be known by grubbing in archives.
If read as conventional intellectual history, however, Gay's Enlightenment has the great advantage of imposing new form on a great deal of unmanageable old matter. Livre et societe holds out little hope for arriving as such a heroic synthesis. Instead, it suggests that we must face another outbreak of monographs, which will take us in a dozen different directions, wherever the data lead. As the data tend to be statistical, they continually raise problems about quantifying cultural phenomena. Literary journals cannot be reduced meaningfully to bar graphs, and literary "influence" still seems too intangible to be computerized. Statistics about book consumption give one a general sense of the cultural terrain, but do not explain the meaning of what it is to "consume" a book. So the social history of ideas is searching for a methodology. It will probably fall back on ad hoc combinations of Cassirer and Mornet until it develops a discipline of its own. If those two masters cannot yet be brought together in a new definition of the Enlightenment, they cannot be left alone. And seen through the work of their successors, their achievement looms larger than ever.
